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This paper considers the nature and extent of the duty of patient confidentiality in the mental
health context, and examines the range circumstances in which it might be overridden, and the way
in which such decisions may be taken. Particular consideration is given to the justifications given
for breaches of patient confidentiality in the name of public safety and victims’ rights. The paper
also addresses rights of access to health information in the case of the incapable adult and the
applicant to the MHRT. 
The legal framework
Disclosure and sharing of information about a person’s health (and social “condition”) is governed
by a complex statutory and common law framework. Individual access to and disclosure of records
is governed principally the Data Protection Act 1998 (“DPA”) – established to provide an 
over-arching scheme for all, not just health or social work, information. It is supplemented by the
Access to Health Records Act 1990. Disclosure before and during litigation is governed by s33 and
34 Supreme Court Act 1981, s52 and 53 County Courts Act 1984 and Part 31 Civil Procedure
Rules. There is guidance on confidentiality and disclosure such as that contained in The Protection
and Use of Patient Information Guidance HSG(96)8 and HSC(2000)9, which may require higher
standards than the DPA, and Confidentiality: Protecting and Providing Information issued by the
GMC in June 2000. Since the coming into force of the Human Rights Act 1998 in 2000, public
authorities and the Courts have further had to have regard to individual rights and positive
obligations arising out of Art. 6 and 8 ECHR in respect of access to, and disclosure of
information. Despite these extensive statutory structures, however, the common law retains an
important role, demonstrated in the cases that still require the determination of the Courts where
disclosure or sharing of information is concerned.
Description and discussion of the detailed provisions of the DPA is beyond the scope of this
paper. A particularly useful summary of its provisions in relation to the health and social work
records of those subject to the Mental Health Act 1983 (“MHA”) is provided by Hale LJ in 
R (S) v Plymouth City Council1:
*Fenella Morris, Barrister, 39 Essex Street Chambers 1 R (S) v Plymouth City Council [2002] 1 WLR 2583
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All of the material requested is “personal data” within the meaning of the Act and so much of
it as related to [the patient’s] “physical or mental health or condition” is “sensitive personal
data” within the meaning of section 2(e). But the processing of even sensitive personal data is
permitted where it is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject or
another person in a case where consent cannot be given by or on behalf of the data subject
(paragraph 3 of Schedule 3); or for the purpose of, or in connection with, any legal proceedings
(including prospective legal proceedings) or for the purpose of obtaining legal advice, or where
it is otherwise necessary for the purposes of establishing, exercising or defending legal rights
(paragraph 6); or where it is necessary for the administration of justice, or for the exercise of
any functions conferred on any person by or under an enactment (paragraph 7). It is common
ground therefore, that the 1998 Act does not prevent the local authority disclosing this
information. Nor, however, does it require the authority to do so.2
Article 8 of the ECHR provides:
(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
(2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such
as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention
of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights
and freedoms of others.
The European Court has held that Art. 8 protects personal data, including health records, and that
respect for the confidentiality of health records is a fundamental right in Z v Finland (1997) 25
EHRR 371:
… the court will take into account that the protection of personal data, not least medical data,
is of fundamental importance to a person’s enjoyment of his or her right to respect for private
and family life as guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention. Respecting the confidentiality of
health data is a vital principle in the legal systems of all the contracting parties to the
Convention. It is crucial not only to respect the sense of privacy of a patient but also to
preserve his or her confidence in the medical profession and in the health services in general.
Without such protection, those in need of medical assistance may be deterred from revealing
such information of a personal and intimate nature as may be necessary in order to receive
appropriate treatment and, even, from seeking such assistance, thereby endangering their own
health and, in the case of transmissible diseases, that of the community. The domestic law must
therefore afford appropriate safeguards to prevent any such communication or disclosure of
personal health data as may be inconsistent with the guarantees in article 8 of the Convention.3
Disclosure of any information for other than the purpose for which it was collected may also in
itself constitute a breach of Art. 8(1) ECHR4. 
As to the justification for breaches of Art. 8(1) contained in Art. 8(2), the European Court
interprets the exceptions narrowly5. Firstly, for a disclosure to be in accordance with law it must
be in accordance with a procedure which enables the data subject to foresee its operation
2 above judgment paragraph 25 page 2593
3 Z v Finland (1997) 25 EHRR 371 paragraph 95 page
405–406
4 T V v Finland DR 140 (1991)
5 Klass v Germany (1978) 2 EHRR 214 and Funke v
France (1993) 16 EHRR 297.
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reasonably clearly6. There should be have adequate legal safeguards to protect against arbitrary
interference in Art. 8(1) rights7. Secondly, the disclosure must be not only for one of the objectives
identified in Art. 8(2), but the disclosure must be proportionate to that objective: a “fair balance”
must be struck between the interests of the individual and society as a whole. In Z v Finland the
European Court held that disclosure of an individual’s HIV status was only justified where there
was an overriding public interest.
The common law will protect information given in confidence where it has the necessary quality
of confidence8 and where the person proposing to disclose the information has obtained it in
circumstances giving rise to an obligation of confidence9. In R (Source Informatics) v Department of
Health10 the Court held that there was no breach of confidence where the information provided
did not disclose the identity of the data subject, in that case about his use of medication. The
common law obligation of confidence may be overridden where there is a legal requirement of
disclosure, where the subject consents and where there is an overriding public interest. For
instance, in W v Egdell11 the Court of Appeal upheld the decision of a doctor asked to prepare an
independent report on a patient for the MHRT to disclose the report to the Secretary of State
although the patient had decided not to disclose it to the MHRT, and withdrawn his application.
The report drew attention to a number of factors relevant to W’s treatment and dangerousness
that had not previously been identified. It was held that the importance of the information with
regard to public safety was so great that it outweighed the usual duty of confidence. Indeed,
following the decision of the European Court in Osman v UK12, it may be said that there is a
positive obligation on public authorities, which might arguably include responsible medical
officers, who have information that identifies a risk to the life of another individual, to disclose
that information in order to protect his right to life under Art. 2 ECHR.
The nature and extent of the duty of confidentiality to patients
The nature and extent of the obligation of patient confidentiality was recently explored by the
House of Lords in Ashworth Hospital Authority v MGN Ltd when their Lordships considered an
application by the hospital for the disclosure of the identity of a journalist’s informant who had
provided him with material concerning Ian Brady’s medical care. The parties agreed that leaks to
the press of confidential information are undesirable because they have: 
… a detrimental effect on security; treatment of patients and staff morale, because they may
inhibit proper recording of patient information about patients; may deter patients from
providing information about themselves; may damage the patient-doctor relationship, which
rests on trust; may lead to assaults by patients on a patient about whom information is
disclosed; may create an atmosphere of distrust amongst staff, which is detrimental to efficient
and co-operative work; and give rise to fear of future (and potentially more damaging leaks).13
6 Petra v Romania (2001) 33 EHRR 
7 Malone v UK (1984) 7 EHRR 14 
8 Saltman Engineering v Campbell [1948] RPC 203
9 Marcel v Police Commissioner [1992] 1 AllER 72
10 R (Source Informatics) v Department of Health [2000]
1 AllER 786
11 W v Egdell [1990] 2 WLR 471
12 Osman v UK (2000) 29 EHRR 245
13 Ashworth Hospital Authority v MGN Ltd [2002] 1
WLR 2033, per Lord Woolf CJ paragraph 17 page
2037
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It was also accepted that it was particularly important that patient records be full and accurate in
special hospitals because otherwise warning signs might be overlooked inhibiting preventative action. 
The question for the Court was how this substantial public interest in preserving patient
confidentiality weighed against the public interest in the protection of journalists’ sources. The
newspaper invoked Art. 10 ECHR, the right to freedom of expression, in its defence and the oft-cited
“chilling effect” of an order for source disclosure on the freedom of the press.14 Their Lordships
ultimately found that on that occasion an order for disclosure was both necessary, in that it met a
pressing social need, and not disproportionate, in respect of the aim which was being pursued.15
It was persuaded, in particular, by the following matters advanced on behalf of Ashworth: 
… it is essential for the care and safety of individual patients and the safety of other patients
and staff that relevant information is entered in the patients’ notes … those entries having been
made, their integrity and confidentiality should be preserved … psychiatry, more than any
other branch of medicine, depends on a trusting relationship between therapists and patients
… the basis of virtually all assessment, diagnosis, treatment and analysis of risk is dependent
on information provided by others …if the staff feel that there is a possibility of what they
report entering the public domain their reporting will be inhibited as they will think that this
will place staff or patients at risk …16
The Court relied upon Z v Finland as a guide to the significance of the wrong done by those who
disclose medical records. It held that it would be “no bad thing” if its judgment had the effect of
discouraging such disclosure in the future. 
Their Lordships’ judgment was not, however, the end of the story for Ashworth. The order for
disclosure it obtained in the Lords was against the newspaper which duly identified the journalist
who had provided it with the information. The journalist himself then refused to disclose his source.
Proceedings were issued against him. An application for summary judgment on the grounds that his
defence had no real prospect of success in the light of their Lordships’ earlier judgment failed17. The
Court of Appeal held that the issues in respect of Mr Ackroyd were different from those in respect
of the newspaper and would not necessarily be determined in the same way, given the balancing
exercise that the Court must carry out. The key factor was Mr Ackroyd’s history as an investigative
journalist exposing wrong-doing at Ashworth and other hospitals. There was a public interest in the
exposure of wrong-doing at the hospital which might, at trial, justify non-disclosure. It might even be
justified by Mr Ackroyd’s need to protect his sources so as to enable him to expose wrong-doing in
the future. It was also significant that Mr Ackroyd’s sources received no payment for the disclosures.
May LJ concluded the lead judgment thus:
Although there is a clear public interest in preserving the confidentiality of medical records,
that alone cannot, in my view, be automatically regarded as an overriding requirement without
examining the facts of a particular case. It would be an exceptional case indeed if a journalist
were ordered to disclose the identity of his source without the facts of his case being fully
examined.18
14 Goodwin v UK (1996) 22 EHRR 123 at paragraph 39
page 143
15 Pages 2050–2051 judgment
16 Paragraph 63 page 2051 judgment
17 Mersey Care NHS Trust v Ackroyd Times, 21 May
2003 and [2003] EWCA Civ 663 
18 Paragraph 70 judgment per May LJ
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Carnwath LJ, however, was concerned to guard the status of medical records more closely. 
His Lordship held:
…it would be inconsistent with the decision of the House of Lords to approach the present
case other than on the basis that, other than in exceptional cases, there is an over-riding public
interest in the protection of medical records from disclosure. In the interests of certainty in the
law and the assurance of those responsible for such records, I would oppose any watering-down
of that principle, even if it were open to sue to do so. There may be circumstances in which a
departure from the normal rule if justified by the public interest; but the circumstances must
be truly exceptional, and they must be directly relevant to the need for disclosure of the records
in question.19
Examples of where the public interest in disclosure might outweigh the interest in medical
confidentiality may therefore include not only “whistle-blowing” in respect of hospitals, but, on
Mr Ackroyd’s submissions, in the care and treatment given to particularly high-profile individuals.
He submitted that there is a public interest in knowing about their treatment, and even the basis
for their criminal acts, and that argument was not rejected by the Court. 
Although the decision in Ackroyd was merely concerned with whether his defence had no prospect
of success, the judgment appears to have opened up the field of interests that might outweigh those
of medical confidentiality. Certainly, it must be debatable whether the confidence of a high-profile
criminal or notorious patient is more easily overridden than that of the unknown one. After all,
such individuals cannot always be said to have voluntarily put themselves in the public eye where
their crimes have been committed when seriously disordered. Further, if the care and treatment of
such individuals may legitimately be a matter of overriding public interest, what aspects might be
included? Difficulties often arise over leaks and reporting of rehabilitation trips for high-profile
offenders. Once there is publicity it can become almost impossible for them to take place, to the
detriment of the individual’s health, and perhaps prolonging his detention. If it is allowed that the
public interest in such matters is so significant that it warrants disclosure, then the balancing
exercise becomes extremely complex.
In almost the opposite situation, the right to protect their sources has been invoked by those
protecting patients, those in residential care homes or receiving any social service. They argue that
“whistle-blowers” or others who bring wrong-doing to light should have their identities protected.
In Leach v National Care Standards Commission, unreported, Master Yoxall, 30 October 2002,
upheld the NCSC’s refusal to disclose the source of, ultimately disproved, allegations of abuse and
neglect at a residential care home for the elderly. The claimant sought disclosure in order to bring
defamation proceedings given the damage the allegations had caused to his business. The Court
found that the public interest in the protection of the vulnerable from abuse, and the particular
need for independent reporting in respect of those who may not be able to raise the alarm
themselves, outweighed the claimant’s interests in disclosure.
19 Paragraph 75
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The administration of the obligation of confidentiality and the right to access:
incapable adults and the DPA20
A significant defect in the all-embracing scheme provided by the DPA is its failure to deal
comprehensively with incapable adults as data subjects.21 While s7 DPA gives the data subject a
range of entitlements to the provision of information22 it does not say who may make the requests
on behalf of an incapable adult, or to whom the information requested should be provided. The
DPA does not require that a request come from the data subject himself, and therefore it is arguable
that it may be made on his behalf. The guidance in HSC2000/9 supports the view that a third party
may make the request on behalf of the incapable adult.23
However, even if a third party may properly request information on behalf of an incapable adult,
the response may only be given to the data subject under s7 DPA. This undermines the utility of
a request being made by a third party if the data subject is incapable of understanding the product.
More fundamentally, it is questionable whether, given the restrictions on processing information,
the DPA is intended to allow a third party to request and receive information on behalf of a data
subject. It is quite easy to see how such an arrangement might be abused. It is right that there is an
obligation on the data controller not to disclose information if it would be likely to cause
significant harm to the physical or mental health or condition of the mental subject or any other
person, or where the information was provided in the expectation that it would not be disclosed24,
however, this falls far short of the “best interests” test upon which reliance is usually placed when
taking decisions about the lives of incapable adults. 
While abuse by the third party is a risk, equally a lack of information creates another set of risks
for the incapable adult. Information is required for relatives and carers to have proper input into
decisions about the health and social care of the incapable. In the absence of a clear statutory
scheme under the DPA, it is left to the discretion of individual professionals to decide whether to,
and how much, information to disclose. Questions may arise not only as to the suitability of
particular treatments or placements, but also as to the entitlement to free care, for instance under
s117 MHA or because eligibility criteria for continuing health care are met. Without information,
those acting on behalf of the capable are significantly hampered. 
What then, are the alternatives, for allowing access to information for a person acting on behalf of
an incapable adult? Some decisions about the disclosure to third parties of health and social care
information concerning incapable adults can be made within existent statutory frameworks. Firstly,
a nearest relative has the following entitlements under the MHA:
1. To have a doctor examine a patient for the purpose of advising as to the exercise of the nearest
relative’s power of discharge. The doctor concerned has the right to require production of
and to inspect records in relation to the detention and treatment of the patient. (s24 MHA)
20 I am grateful for the assistance of Kristina Stern and
Nicola Greaney of 39 Essex Street in preparing this part
of the paper.
21 The repealed scheme did deal with the issue.
22 Being informed whether or not data about him is being
processed, the purpose of the data-processing, the
persons to whom it may be disclosed, being provided with
the data itself, decision-making about him.
23 Paragraph 5.2
24 Regulation 5 of the Data Protection (Subject Access
Modification) (Health) Order 2000 and the Data
Protection (Subject Access Modification) (Social Work)
Order 2000
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2. To have a patient examined and to require production of medical records relating to detention
and treatment for the purposes of advising whether an application to an MHRT should be
made. (s76 MHA)
3. Hospital managers are obliged to inform the nearest relative, unless the patient objects, of the
provisions under which the patient is detained, and their rights to apply to the MHRT. (s132
MHA)
4. To have all the documents before the MHRT disclosed, where the nearest relative is the
applicant, unless the MHRT is satisfied that the disclosure would adversely affect the health
or welfare of the patient or others. (r12 MHRT Rules 1984)
The entitlement of the nearest relative to information concerning an incapable adult subject to the
MHA in circumstances broader than this was tested in R (S) v Plymouth City Council25. S, the mother
and nearest relative of a person subject to guardianship, sought disclosure of confidential medical
and social work information concerning her son to allow her to make decisions about the exercise
of her powers as nearest relative. S particularly sought disclosure of medical records, including
medical recommendation forms, not only to herself but also to two experts engaged to advise her
whether or not to apply to discharge her son from guardianship. The local authority refused
disclosure. Hale LJ held that the issue fell to be decided with reference the common law and the
Human Rights Act 1998 both of which required that:
…a balance must be struck between the public and private interests in maintaining the
confidentiality of this information and the public and private interests in permitting, indeed
requiring, its disclosure for certain purposes.26
As to the content of the material sought, Hale LJ took the view that it was not uniform in character.
Where files contained information that was, for example, a “straightforward description of
everyday life” it would not need to be treated as confidential.27 Further, Hale LJ held that an
obligation of confidence may have different “breadths”: a report brought into existence for certain
authorised purposes may be disclosed to those concerned with those purposes, although not to
others. 
Applying that approach to S’s case, Hale LJ saw little difficulty in disclosing medical
recommendation forms to the nearest relative, with whom there had to be consultation about the
matters addressed there, or documents that would be before an MHRT to which S was entitled to
apply.28 There was a clear distinction for her Ladyship between disclosure to an identified
individual for an identified purpose, and wider disclosure.29
Finally, Hale LJ relied upon the requirements of procedural fairness, at common law and under
Art. 6 ECHR, which require that anything relevant to a Court’s adjudication is disclosed to both
parties unless there is another sufficiently powerful interest to outweigh it, for example, a risk of
harm to a child.30 For such an interest to outweigh that of fairness, it must, as usual, have a proper
objective, and be proportionate to that objective.
25 R (S) v Plymouth City Council [2002] 1 WLR 2583
26 above paragraph 32 page 2594
27 Paragraph 33 page 2594. Although this approach may
beg the question of what is confidential which may often
depend on context.
28 Paragraph 34 page 2595.
29 Paragraph 49 page 2599
30 Paragraph 36 page 2595
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Hale LJ found that the relevant interests in S’s case could be summarised thus:
…the confidentiality of the information sought; the proper administration of justice; the
mother’s right of access to legal advice to enable her to decide whether or not to exercise a right
which is likely to lead to legal proceedings against her if she does so; the rights of both C and
his mother to respect for their family life and adequate involvement in decision-making
processes about it; C’s right to respect for his private life; and the protection of C’s health and
welfare. In some cases there might also be an interest in the protection of other people, but that
has not been seriously suggested here.31
Balancing these considerations, the Court concluded that they favoured an order for disclosure of
the information sought to S and the experts that she had instructed.
There are three further authorities which offer some assistance in defining the nature and extent of
common law rights and obligations in respect of the health records of incapable adults. In R v Mid
Glamorgan Family Health Services Authority ex p Mann32 the Court considered the extent of
hospitals’ rights over health records. It held that a hospital must act in the best interests of its
patient, or in that case ex-patient, in deciding to what to do with his records. The case was resolved
by an agreement that the records would be disclosed to the applicant’s expert. 
In R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Amnesty International, Kingdom of Belgium
and others, unreported, 15 February 2000, the Court directed the disclosure of the medical report
on General Pinochet to those states which sought his extradition. It was satisfied that the
requirements of fairness outweighed those of confidentiality. 
In A Health Authority v X33 the Court of Appeal again identified a particular public interest that
outweighed that of confidentiality – the public interest in effective disciplinary proceedings. The
Court held that the substantial public interest in the proper administration of professional
disciplinary proceedings, particularly in the field of medicine, was analogous to the public interest
in the administration of the criminal justice system. 
Having regard to these dicta, it might be argued that an appropriate scheme for access to and
disclosure of the heath and social work records of incapable adults should emerge from a broad
construction of the DPA and its associated regulations in the light of the common law. The Data
Protection (Subject Access) (Modification) (Health) Order 2000 proceeds on the basis that a person
with parental responsibility, in the case of a child, or a person appointed by the Court of
Protection34, in the case of an adult incapable of managing his property and affairs, may request
information on behalf of the child or incapable adult concerned. In the absence of such an
individual, a litigation friend, nearest relative, or other “statutory” individual with an appropriate
interest in the information sought, should be permitted to make a request on the incapable
person’s behalf. Where no relevant statutory scheme is engaged by the subject matter of the
request, an appropriate individual, having regard to the incapable adult’s best interests should be
permitted to make the request. Certainly, it seems appropriate to tie the right of the third party to
make the request and receive the information to both its subject matter and the third party’s
involvement in the life of the incapable adult. Indeed, it might be said that the assumption that an
31 Paragraph 48 page 2599
32 R v Mid Glamorgan Family Health Services Authority
ex p Mann [1995] 1 AllER 356
33 A Health Authority v X [2001] EWCA Civ 2014
34 Guidance suggests that this might also be an attorney
under an Enduring Power of Attorney.
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attorney or individual appointed by the Court of Protection should be entitled so to act is flawed
since their powers are expressly limited to business, legal and financial matters and do not extend
to decisions about health and social care.35
The data processor’s decision to disclose should be made having regard, first, to the restrictions
imposed by the DPA itself, and then, second, to the best interests of the incapable adult. While it
must be admitted that such an approach involves a great stretch in the words of the DPA, it
nevertheless provides a workable framework that does not deprive incapable adults of the benefits
conferred by the DPA while at the same time providing them with a reasonable amount of
protection from abuse.
Interpreting the DPA thus would fulfill the State’s positive obligations to allow access to personal
information (held to be a potential obligation in Gaskin v UK36) and to take steps to ensure the
physical and psychological integrity of the disabled (establised in the context of the provision of
community care services in Botta v Italy37and R (Bernard) v LB Enfield38).
MHRT: withholding and disclosure of reports
Rule 6(4) MHRT Rules 1984 empowers those required to provide reports to the MHRT on a
patient to withhold part of the report from him39 if, in the opinion of authority preparing the
report, it should be withheld on the ground that its disclosure would adversely effect his health or
welfare of him or others. Rule 12(2) MHRT Rules provides that the MHRT must, in respect of
documents which have been so withheld, consider whether disclosure to the patient would
adversely effect the health or welfare of the patient or others. Plainly, the Human Rights Act 1998
now requires that the MHRT carrying out this balancing exercise informed by the ECHR.
However, the rights potentially engaged are numerous, and each may point in a different direction:
1. Art. 2 may require non-disclosure to the patient where to do so would threaten the life of, say,
an informant
2. Art. 8(1), similarly, may impose a positive obligation not to disclose to protect the physical
and psychological health of another person, particularly a vulnerable person
3. Art. 8(1) ECHR may impose a positive obligation not to disclose where to do so would
jeopardise the physical and psychological health of the patient, 
4. Art. 8(1) might also require disclosure to the patient where he should be allowed access to
personal information about himself
5. Art. 6, the right to a fair hearing, may also require disclosure to the patient and to his
representatives, to enable him to meet the case against him. This right might be in direct
conflict with the positive obligation to protect a patient’s health under Art. 8(1).
In this sense, the human rights context introduces no trump consideration into the deliberations
of an MHRT on the question of disclosure.
35 Re F [1990] 2 AC 1
36 Gaskin v UK (1989) 12 EHRR 36
37 Botta v Italy (1998) 26 EHRR 241
38 R (Bernard) v LB Enfield [2002] EWHC 2282
(Admin).
39 Or the nearest relative if he is the applicant.
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Where the MHRT must balance the interests of the patient against the wider community, and
those concerned with his treatment and care, it is reasonably clear how each party may make its
case. However, a particular difficulty arises where the individual who may be threatened by the
disclosure of information contained in a report to which the patient seeks access is not a party to
the MHRT. Art. 6 would usually require that such an individual be enabled to make
representations on the issue of disclosure, but there is no express provision in the Rules for such
an application. It might be undesirable to make that individual a “party” to the MHRT under r7(f)
MHRT Rules where it would be inappropriate for him to have access to all the reports or to attend
the hearing. However, the MHRT might allow the individual concerned to make representations on
the issue of disclosure alone pursuant to r22(4) MHRT Rules.
MHRT: victims’ rights to information 
The Code of Practice issued under s118 MHA gives the following guidance as to he information to
be provided to victims and their families in respect of patients detained under Part III of the Act. 
Where a patient detained under Part III of the Act is both competent and willing to agree to
the disclosure of specified information about his or her care, this should be encouraged to
enable victims and victims’ families to be informed about progress. It can be important to a
patient’s rehabilitation that victims understand what has been achieved in terms of modifying
offending behaviour … Without prejudice to a patient’s right to confidentiality, care teams
should be ready to discuss with him or her the benefits of enabling some information to be
given by professionals to victims, within the spirit of the Victim’s Charter (Home Officer, 1996).
The patient’s agreement to do so must be freely given and he or she will need to understand the
implications of agreeing to information being given to the victim(s). Care must be taken not to
exert any pressure on the patients or this may bring into question the validity of the consent.40
The position of victims or the relatives of victims in the MHRT was considered in two cases
concerning, G, a patient, and T, his ex-partner and mother of the child he killed. T believed that
she was at risk from G, should he be discharged. She was notified of his application to the MHRT
by the local police. T attended the MHRT hearing asking to see the medical reports, be present
throughout the hearing and make submissions to the MHRT. G did not agree. The MHRT did not
think it appropriate to accede to T’s request given the information it already had before it, believing
that T could draw any other relevant information to its attention by making written
representations, which she was invited to do under r14(1) MHRT Rules 1983. T applied for judicial
review of the MHRT’s decision but permission was, perhaps not surprisingly, refused. 
The parameters of the power of the MHRT to allow victims, past or potential, to involve
themselves in its proceedings are circumscribed thus:
1. It may give notice of the proceedings to any person who, in its opinion, should have an
opportunity of being heard. (r7(f) MHRT Rules)
40 In Munjaz [2003] EWCA Civ 1036 the Court of
Appeal held that, in respect of seclusion, the Code
should be observed unless there is good reason to depart
from it in relation to specific groups of patients with
well-defined characteristics, or individual patients. 
Although this decision was concerned with seclusion, it is
arguable that a similar approach should obtain in respect of
all matters where fundamental rights are engaged. That
should include patient confidentiality.
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2. It must sit in private unless the patient requests a hearing in public and it is satisfied that a
hearing in public would not be contrary to the patient’s interests. (r21(1))
3. It may admit to the hearing such persons on such terms as it thinks fit. (r21(3))
4. Information about proceedings before it, and the names of the persons concerned must
remain private, save as the MHRT may direct. (r21(5))
5. Subject to rule 21(4), which gives the MHRT power to exclude persons from its proceedings,
the MHRT may allow any person to take such part in a hearing as it thinks proper. (r22(4))
6. Before or during any hearing it may call for such further information or reports as it may
think desirable, and may give directions as to the manner in which and the persons by whom
such material is to be furnished. (r15)
It is readily apparent, however, that these rules might allow a MHRT to form the view that it was
appropriate to allow a victim to attend, even if that involved him hearing the evidence. Such a
decision should, however, involve the most careful balancing of the public interest in patient
confidentiality as against safety, or, arguably, a fair hearing. It is difficult to imagine what interest
an individual such as T might have which could not adequately be met by being allowed to make
written, or perhaps oral, representations, without knowing what was said about the patient before
the MHRT. Further, it is doubtful whether the MHRT would have the power to disclose the reports
before it to such an individual given that the Rules only provide for service of them on the patient,
responsible authority and Secretary of State.
In G’s case the MHRT, having given T the opportunity to make representations, went on to direct
that he be conditionally discharged. T, on learning of this decision, then asked to be told the
conditions on G’s discharge, and the reasons for its deferral. The MHRT declined, relying on the
House of Lords’ judgment Pickering v Liverpool Daily Post and Echo Newspapers plc41 where it was
held that it was a contempt of Court to publish the fact that a named patient had made an
application to the MHRT for discharge, the date, time or place of the hearing, that he had been
released from detention, or the conditions on his discharge or the reasons for its decision. 
T applied for judicial review of that decision.42 In the course of that application she sought further
information about the level of risk G was believed to pose to others.
Scott Baker J, as he then was, deciding T’s application, held that Pickering was concerned with
protecting patients from press intrusion. It was not authority for the proposition that the MHRT
was never empowered to provide the information sought by T to others.43 Their Lordships left
open the possibility, in accordance with the provisions set out above, that the cloak of privacy
around MHRT proceedings might be lifted at the MHRT’s discretion. Scott Baker J took the view
that this interpretation accords with the words of s78(2)(e) MHA44 and that r21 of the 1983 Rules
must be read in that way.45
41 Pickering v Liverpool Daily Post and Echo Newspapers
plc [1991] 2 AC 370
42 (R (T) v MHRT [2002] Lloyd’s Rep Med 324)
43 Paragraphs 18–21
44 Which creates a power to make provision “For enabling
a Tribunal to exclude members of the public, or any
specified class of members of the public, from any
proceedings of the tribunal, or to prohibit the publication
of reports of any such proceedings or the name of any of
the persons concerned in such proceedings”.
45 Paragraphs 28–34
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Scott Baker J held that the MHRT, when considering whether information should be disclosed,
should ask what “need” the person concerned has for the information sought.46 Scott Baker J then
applied that test to the information sought by T, which she said was necessary in the interests of
her safety. His Lordship found that the usual conditions on discharge as to residence, supervision
and medical treatment were not relevant to T. However, a condition that the patient should not live
in a particular area or communicate with a particular individual might be relevant, and there was
“no reason” why information of that nature should not be made public.47 T’s arguments advanced
under Arts. 2 and 8 ECHR were rejected on the grounds that the evidence was inadequate to show
that the threshold for engagement of those provisions was met in her case.48
It was believed at the time of the judgment that the making explicit of this power of the MHRT
would create a new decision-making burden on it and pave the way for a significant number of
applications. However, I and my colleagues are not aware of any. It is interesting to consider what
other information it might in other circumstances be appropriate for the MHRT to disclose and to
whom. It seems difficult to identify information beyond that allowed by Scott Baker J in his
judgment which it might be appropriate to disclose when, fundamentally, a victim or his relatives
must be obliged to rely on the expert judgment of the MHRT in making decisions as to discharge,
and health and social care providers in managing the patient in the community.
It should also be noted that, while s69 Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000 imposes an
obligation on the probation service to consult victims of violent and sexual offenders, on whom a
“relevant” custodial sentence has been imposed, on the conditions and requirements that should
be imposed on the offender on release, Parliament has made no equivalent provision in relation to
patients detained under Part III MHA. 
Information-sharing and MAPPs
The Code of Practice contemplates information-sharing between health professionals and others
in the public interest, particularly the protection of personal and health safety, but considers that
it will be “occasional”.49 In recent years, however, information-sharing between health, social
services, the police and probation has become something more than occasional, particularly in the
sphere of forensic psychiatry and patients detained under Part III MHA. There is a detailed
statutory framework for the registration, monitoring and information-sharing of sex offenders and
those who may pose a risk to children and vulnerable adults under the Sex Offenders Act 1997,
Protection of Children Act 1999, Education (Restriction of Employment) Regulations 2000, Care
Standrards Act 2000. These statutory provisions define quite closely what steps may be taken in
the regulation of the lives of such individuals. Less well-defined, however, and used increasingly in
respect of the group of patients mentioned above, are Multi-agency Public Protection Panels
(“MAPPPs”). These were established in fulfillment of the obligation imposed on police and
probation agencies by s67 Criminal Justice and Courts Service Act 2000 to “establish arrangements




49 Paragraph 1.8: “Ordinarily, information about a
patient should not be disclosed without the patient’s
consent. Occasionally it may be necessary to pass on
particular information to professionals or others in the
public interest, for instance where personal health or
safety is at risk. Any such disclosure should be in
accordance with the principles set out in the Guidance
[i.e. HSG(96)18]
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violent offenders, and other persons who are considered by (them) to be persons who may cause
serious harm to the public”. The Home Office’s publications acknowledge that MAPPs’
memberships now extend far beyond the police and probation to include social services, education
services, housing services and mental health care providers.
The involvement of MAPPs in considering the arrangements for persons with mental disorder has
two key consequences. Firstly, it is increasingly common for the MAPP or the police to make
representations to an MHRT considering an individual’s discharge based on their assessment of
the risk that he may pose if discharged, focussing solely upon “risk” and without specific regard
to the context of the individual’s mental disorder. Thus, where an individual poses a risk regardless
of his mental disorder, the police and probation may become involved in decisions about his
discharge. MHRTs appear prepared to allow police representatives to attend hearings and make
representations, although I am not aware of cases where they have been permitted to remain
present to hear all the evidence.
The second consequence of MAPPs for patients is that they have established a new, statutory
forum with the purpose of information-sharing. Of particular concern in a human rights context
is the extent to which health information is shared at a MAPP. A MAPP meeting at which health
care providers attend has the potential to create a de facto expectation that information will be
shared in the interests of public protection, rather than the historical position reflected in the
guidance where information might be shared “occasionally” and in “exceptional circumstances”.
Moreover, information that might properly be shared with one individual or agency, may then be
shared with others for whom there is not the same justification. There is little or no opportunity
for scrutiny of the decisions made to share health information in those fora. In those
circumstances there must be a residual concern that patients’ Art. 8 rights are not adequately
protected by these arrangements. Health information may be shared for purposes other than for
which it was originally collected. It may be shared in circumstances where patients know little
about MAPPs and their work, what information will be shared there and the use to which it will
be put. It may be shared in circumstances where a Court may not be satisfied that there is an
overriding public interest in its disclosure, having regard to the requirements of proportionality,
for example, where more than necessary information about an individual’s health is disclosed to
the police.
